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Abstract 
Much literature on political behavior treats politicians as motivated by reelection, choosing 
actions to signal their types to voters. We identify two novel implications of models in which 
signalling  incentives  are  important.  First,  because  incumbents  only  care  about  clearing  a 
reelection hurdle, signals will tend to cluster just above the threshold needed for reelection. 
This generates a skew distribution of signals leading to an incumbency advantage in the 
probability of election. Second, voters can exploit the signalling behavior of politicians by 
precommitting to a higher threshold for signals received. Raising the threshold discourages 
signalling effort by low quality politicians but encourages effort by high quality politicians, 
thus increasing the separation of signals and improving the selection function of an election. 
This  precommitment  has  a  simple  institutional  interpretation  as  a  supermajority  rule, 
requiring that incumbents exceed some fraction of votes greater than 50% to be reelected.  
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It has long been recognized that incumbent politicians can take actions in order to aect
voters' perception of their types, and that such signalling has the potential to explain
important empirical phenomena. For example, it has been argued that high-ability in-
cumbents may have incentives to engineer pre-election booms in order to distinguish
themselves from low-ability ones [Rogo (1990), Rogo and Sibert (1988)]. Signalling
has also been used to explain \pandering", where the incumbent may have incentives
to ignore private information and pander to the prior opinion of the median voter [e.g.
Canes-Wrone et al. (2001), Maskin and Tirole (2004), Morelli and Van Weelden (2011b)],
and\posturing", where the incumbent puts eort on a divisive issue that helps signal the
congruence of his or her preferences with the majority [e.g. Morelli and Van Weelden
(2011a), Acemoglu et al. (2011)].
This paper identies two new potentially important implications of incumbent sig-
nalling, one positive and one normative. The novel positive implication is that incumbent
signalling can lead to an incumbency advantage. The novel normative implication is that
when incumbents signal it may be optimal to handicap them in reelection races, i.e. to
make reelection conditional on receiving a supermajority of votes.
It is well known that incumbents enjoy disproportionate reelection rates, even in coun-
tries where the electoral process is generally deemed to be free and fair [Gelman and King
(1990)]. In part, this phenomenon can be explained by selection: the pool of incumbents
who run for reelection may contain a disproportionately large fraction of high-quality
politicians. However, there is a broad consensus, recently buttressed by new empirical
ndings aiming at controlling for selection [Ansolabehere et al. (2000), Lee (2008), Levitt
and Wolfram (1997)], that incumbency per se has a causal eect on election outcomes.1
In other words incumbency confers direct electoral benets even when candidates are of
similar quality. This paper shows that such a causal incumbency advantage is a natural
side-eect of the advantage that sitting politicians have in being able to signal their type.2
We present a model in which voters choose between an incumbent and a challenger,
with both politicians drawn from the same symmetric distribution of three types: low,
middle, and high quality.3 This signal has three components: the true quality of the
1Levitt and Wolfram (1997) compare repeated pairings of candidates for election to the US Congress,
in an attempt to control for the quality of incumbent and challenger. They nd that the winner of
the previous race has on average a 4% higher vote share in the second pairing. Ansolabehere et al.
(2000) compare county-level vote shares after redistricting in US Congressional elections. They nd that
incumbents receive 4% fewer votes in counties which have been redistricted into their constituencies, than
in counties which remained in their constituency for both elections. Lee (2008) compares bare winners
and bare losers of elections. He nds that a party which barely wins a Congressional election has on
average an 8% higher vote share and a 35% higher probability of winning the next election.
2An alternative explanation for a causal incumbency advantage is that incumbents \improve" with
tenure, either thanks to the accumulated experience, or because seniority makes them more inuential
[Dick and Lott (1993)]. This explanation and our signalling explanation are not mutually exclusive.
3As will become clear it is not possible to get a causal incumbency-advantage result in a model with
1incumbent, the signalling eort exerted by the incumbent, and noise.4 Under fairly mild
assumptions middling-quality incumbents exert the greatest signalling eorts, as high-
quality ones can rely on their true quality to convince voters, while low-quality ones are
discouraged by the excessive eort costs that would be required to fool voters. Therefore,
the distribution of signals observed by voters is skewed: more than 50 percent of signals
lead to posterior expected quality that is greater than the average quality (i.e., greater than
the expected quality of the challenger). As a result, more than 50 percent of incumbents
will be re-elected. This implies an incumbency advantage. In particular, middle-quality
incumbents win elections against challengers (whose expected quality is middle) more
than 50% of the time.
Because of the noise component to the signal some low-quality incumbents are re-
elected, despite sending signals that are on average lower than those of the other two
types. Voters' welfare could therefore improve if voters were able to devise a mechanism
to further reduce the relative signalling eort of low-quality incumbents, so as to enhance
the separation between them and the others. One way to do this would be for voters to
become more picky, i.e. to raise somewhat the threshold signal required for their support.
Such a handicap would weaken the incentive of low-quality incumbents to exert eort,
while strengthening the incentive of medium and high-quality incumbents to exert eort.
This positive eect on the selection of incumbents must be traded o against the negative
eect of selecting fewer incumbents. We show that there is always a set of reelection
thresholds above the one associated with average quality with a net eect of raising the
average quality of elected politicians.
One diculty is that adhering to such a handicapping strategy is not time consistent,
i.e. voters do not want to enforce it ex post, as on an ex-post basis it is always rational
to vote for any incumbent whose expected quality is greater than middle. We thus sug-
gest a simple constitutional mechanism for implementation: a supermajority rule, where
incumbent politicians require a share of the vote strictly greater than one half in order to
win reelection. This mechanism exactly replicates the outcome that would occur if voters
were able to commit to the optimal expected-quality threshold.
Supermajority rules (also called \special majority") are common in constitutions, for
example the US Congress can bypass the US President's veto only with a two thirds
majority, while a very large number of countries require parliamentary supermajorities,
typically of two thirds, to implement constitutional changes. While we are not aware of
any supermajority rule being used to explicitly handicap the election of incumbents in
the way that we suggest, a similar eect is produced by existing institutions, as constitu-
tional term limits can generally be overturned by a supermajority of legislators. The net
only two types (which is the standard in the literature): three types is the minimum necessary for the
result. As we discuss in Section 7, our later optimal supermajority result could instead be potentially
derived in a model with two types only.
4Our model is extremely similar to the Matthews and Mirman (1983) model of limit pricing, but that
paper does not derive analogues of either our incumbency advantage or supermajority results.
2eect is then something similar to a supermajority rule on reelection. We might there-
fore interpret recurrent attempts (often successful) around the world by popular sitting
presidents to have term limits extended by passing constitutional amendments requiring
a supermajority of favorable votes in the legislative body as a rough way of implementing
the mechanism we propose.
Similar incumbency advantage and supermajority results to the ones we derive here will
also occur in a much simpler model with na ve voters. Suppose that there are two kinds
of voters - sophisticated and na ve - and that the preferences of the median sophisticated
voter coincide with social welfare. Na ve voters instead always vote for the incumbent
because, for example, they are irrationally inuenced by advertising, and incumbents
always advertise more than challengers. In this case we would expect an incumbency
advantage equal to x% of the vote share, where x is the proportion of voters who are
na ve. Further, a supermajority handicap on the incumbent of exactly x% would make
the democratic outcome welfare maximizing. Much of the novelty of this paper is to show
that such results hold even when voters are rational.
As already stated our paper contributes to the literature on signalling in games between
politicians and voters. Most of this literature is concerned with how signalling incentives
can explain some seemingly perverse policy outcome (e.g. an incentive to engineer a pre-
election boom). Hence, it is of central importance for these studies' purposes that the
signalling action itself is directly welfare-relevant for the voters (it is typically a policy
decision). Our focus is not on how signalling leads to bad policies, but on how signalling
explains reelection outcomes or how electoral systems can be changed to improve the
quality of reelection outcomes. Hence, it is not important to us if signalling eort has
independent welfare implications. Accordingly, for simplicity we model signalling merely
as a message with no direct welfare relevance (though, of course, with potential indirect
welfare implications through the quality of the winner of the election).
Since we interpret signalling as simply sending a message from the incumbent to the
voters the most natural interpretation is as a form of spin, propaganda, advertising, or
persuasion.5 It is a matter of everyday observation that incumbent politicians devote
large amount of resources and eort to these forms of communication with the voters,
suggesting that they are seen as an important factor in reelections.6 However this common
5In the political literature we nd the following tting denition of spin in Moloney (2001): \To `spin'
is to give the words describing a policy, personality or event a favourable gloss with the intention that
the mass media will use them to the political advantage of the spinner and so gain public support"(page
125);\...Spin is a weak or soft form of propaganda [...] where the activity can be identied as information
manipulation; where the information is more accurate than inaccurate, and where the purpose of the spin
is known, to enhance the standing of the government or opposition party..."(page 128).
6Cain et al. (1987) state that: \Incumbents win because they are better known and more favorably
evaluated by any wide variety of measures. And they are better known and more favorably evaluated
because, among other factors, they bombard constituents with missives containing a predominance of
favorable material, maintain extensive district oce operations to service their constituencies, use modern
technology to target groups of constituents with particular policy interests, and vastly outspend their
opponents"(p10).
3observation is dicult to reconcile with rational expectations, where extra information
about the incumbent should not systematically bias voters' beliefs. Our model not only
uses the observation that politicians engage in spin to explain incumbency advantage (and
derive optimal electoral institutions), but also implies a rationalization of the phenomenon
of spin itself. Having said that, the key insights of the paper would also arise in a model
where incumbents signaled their talent through the choice of a public policy.7 We abstract
from this because we want to isolate the informational eect of signalling and its indirect
welfare implications
The paper also contributes to the literature on incumbency and optimal electoral ar-
rangements. The classic view is that the possibility of reelection induces good behavior on
the part of incumbents [Barro (1973), Ferejohn (1986)]. Another advantage of reelection
is that it allows selection of high-quality incumbents [Samuelson (1984)]. With socially-
costly signalling such arguments can break down, and indeed signalling models have been
used to advocate term limits.8 In our model a simple majority election rule is always
better than a term limit (because we have assumed no social cost to signalling eort).
However a simple majority is not the optimal institutional arrangement, as the selection
function of elections can be improved by a supermajority rule.
In independent work Gersbach (2007; 2010), like us, proposes a supermajority rule.
In Gersbach (2007), the politician's type is fully revealed to voters once they are elected.
However low quality incumbents are sometimes re-elected because while in power they
implement policies with benets that are contingent on reelection, thus generating com-
plementarities between terms in oce. A supermajority rule can deter such hostage-taking
policies. Gersbach (2010) proposes a model in which incumbents signal their ability with
costly eort, which generates similar predictions regarding optimal reelection thresholds.
His model however displays a continuum of pooling and semi-separating equilibria, and
hence welfare judgments are derived under assumptions about the likelihood distribution
over equilibria. Our modeling assumptions allow us to avoid such equilibrium selection
problems.
There is also a related theoretical literature on Persuasion, in which a Sender can
release veriable information to a Receiver. When information release is free then, in
general, unraveling will occur, i.e. all information will be released [Grossman (1981), Mil-
grom (1981)]. The model in this paper can be reinterpreted as a persuasion model with
7In particular, the incumbency advantage result remains true independently of the form of signalling.
The supermajority result may no longer hold, because the direct eect of the signalling action on welfare
may alter the tradeos in setting the optimal threshold. However the separation eects we uncover would
still be present, and, would have to be taken into account in choosing the optimal reelection threshold.
8In particular, Smart and Sturm (2006) use a pandering model to analyze term limits. Their model has
two types of politicians and information about the economy which is private to the politician. Reelection
incentives cause both types to ignore their private information, for fear of being perceived as a low type.
A term limit, which removes reelection incentives, can eliminate the distortion in policy choice and so
raise welfare. Under certain parameters their model also predicts that a two-period term limit is superior
to a one-period limit, because there will be some sorting of politicians in the rst term.
4costly information release, in this way avoiding the unravelling conclusion. In such an in-
terpretation a candidate's quality would correspond to a quantity of favorable information
she is able to release costlessly, and the costly signalling eort would be interpreted as
releasing further favorable information by paying a cost. Because such a model assumes
it is costly to release additional information, not all of it will be released, i.e. unraveling
will not occur. Formally this is close to the model of costly persuasion in Kartik et al.
(2007), although that paper does not have noise or a discontinuous payo function, as in
this paper.9;10
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model,
and characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the case of the simple majority
rule. Section 4 shows that under simple majority rule an incumbency advantage exists
in equilibrium. Section 5 shows that the optimal reelection rule is a supermajority rule.
Section 6 proposes an illustrative calibration, and Section 7 presents further discussions
of the relationship between incumbency advantage and optimal reelection thresholds, the
welfare signicance of signalling, issues of implementation of the supermajority rule, and
possible extensions.
2 The Model
We study a game between two politicians - incumbent and challenger - and a continuum
of voters. Both incumbent and challenger are dened by their talent  which is seen
as a random variable. Talent may be understood as the quality of the politician, a
characteristic orthogonal to the political space, valued by every voter in the same way.11
Examples of what might be called talent are competence and honesty. The talents of
both politicians are drawn from the same distribution and are privately known only to
the politicians themselves.
We assume that the distribution of talents is symmetric and has three types, i.e.
 2   fL;M;Hg, with equal distance  between the extremes and the middle types
(H   M = M   L  ), and where a politician has the same probability p of being of
high or low talent (p = Pr(H) = Pr(L)).
We have assumed symmetry in the distribution of types because we want to isolate
9We note that costly release of veriable information may be a good representation of the extensive
persuasion activity observed in political campaigning. Much campaigning is, at least supercially, the
release of veriable information. Yet campaigns show a bias towards releasing favorable information,
contradicting the unraveling prediction of models of costless release of information.
10Finally, one further related paper in the persuasion literature is the recent contribution by Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011). In our terminology they allow the sender to commit to an eort function before
learning their type. Although strategically quite dierent they also nd that, when the sender's payo
function is discontinuous in expected type, the distribution of expected types will tend to have a negative
skew (i.e., the median expected type is above the mean).
11This concept is also called in the literature quality or valence [Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000);
Carrillo and Castanheira (2002); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009; 2008)].
5the eect of the manipulation of the messages on the incumbency advantage. If the
distribution of talent was skewed, for example if the median talent was above the mean, we
would expect an incumbency advantage even without the manipulation of the messages.12
We consider a three-type distribution because it is the minimum required to generate an
incumbency advantage. Simulations with continuous distributions make us believe that
the result is true more generally, but we leave derivations for future work.
The asymmetry between incumbent and challenger comes from the fact that before the
election voters receive a signal of the incumbent's quality. The signal has two components,
a \message" sent by the incumbent, and a noise component. The message, denoted by
~ , is in turn an additive combination of the politician's talent and his eort, ~  =  + e.
The cost of eort is increasing and convex, denoted by c(); and incurred only by the
incumbent.13 That the message is increasing in costly eort is the key assumption of the
paper. Since each incumbent's starting point is her true quality, this has the implication
that lower quality incumbents must make a greater eort than higher quality ones to send
the same message. One can think about this assumption as roughly capturing the idea
that for an incumbent it is relatively easier to spin as a success a middling policy outcome
than a policy disaster.
Voters receive the message with some noise, representing the many unobservables
which contribute to political outcomes, and constrain voters' ability to infer a politician's
quality. Both the incumbency advantage and the supermajority result can be derived
without noise, but noise eliminates pooling and semi-separating equilibria and hence allows
us to explore the comparative statics of the equilibria. Also, noise generates a realistically
continuous distribution of vote shares, which we use in our calibration. Finally, assuming
that incumbents's messages are received with noise is simply realistic.
To dierentiate between the information sent by the incumbent and the information
received by voters, we have called message what the incumbent sends and signal what
the voters receive. The signal is equal to the original message, plus noise, s = ~  + ,
where  is drawn from a continuous distribution with mean zero, symmetric and single
peaked density distribution function g() with full support on the real line and cumulative
distribution function G().
Note that all voters receive the same signal, i.e. the noise is common to all voters.14
However, voters dier in their preferences for the incumbent. We assume that the utility
12To see this, suppose that the voters could perfectly learn a politician's talent once he is in power.
Then in more than 50% of elections the voters will discover that the incumbent has greater talent than
the expected talent of the challenger, and hence they will strictly prefer to keep that politician. So more
than 50% of the candidates will be re-elected. In a symmetric distribution, no incumbency advantage
can arise without manipulation of the messages.
13The additive composition of the message is not required, all the results of the paper hold as long as
the cost function is submodular in the message and the talent.
14We discuss in footnote 26 the general eects of heterogenous information.
6of voter i given an incumbent with talent  is given by:
ui() =  + i (1)
where i represents voter i's relative preference for the incumbent over the challenger. We
assume that i has a continuous density h(), strictly positive on [;], where  () might
be minus (plus) innity. We denote the cumulative distribution function by H() and we
assume that both its mean and its median equal 0.
This model can be seen as a reduced form of a model in which, after the incumbent
sends his message to the population, both incumbent and challenger (oce motivated)
announce their political platforms with Downsian commitment [Downs (1957)]. In any
subgame perfect equilibrium of such a model, there would be convergence of platforms
to the median voter's preferences, and hence the choice of eort is taken as if the voters
had preferences given by (1).15 Finally, we assume that voters support the incumbent
when indierent, though because the noise distribution is atomless, the probability of an
indierence occurring is vanishingly small.
Politicians are only oce-motivated. Being in oce leads to a reward of . Their only
cost is the cost of eort. Thus the incumbent chooses the level of eort to maximize
V (;e) = Pr(reelectionj;e)   c(e)
The game has two decision stages. In the rst stage the incumbent sends a message
that the voters receive with some noise. In the second stage the voters cast their vote.
The outcome of the election depends on the votes cast and the reelection rule. We will
denote a reelection rule by q when the incumbent needs at least the fraction q of the votes
in order to be re-elected.
In Section 3 we consider the particular case of simple majority rule for which q = 1
2.
Given voters' preferences a simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all power to the
median voter. On the other hand, as we will discuss later in Section 5, a supermajority
rule is equivalent to giving all the power to a voter who is opposed to or dislikes the
incumbent. In order to be re-elected the incumbent's talent should be high enough to
gain the support of this hostile voter.
Given a reelection rule q, an equilibrium is dened by an eort rule, eq :  ! [0;+1)
15There is a recent literature that focuses on the interaction between the choice of eort and the choice
of platform [see Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000); Aragones and Palfrey (2002); Carrillo and Castanheira
(2002); Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009); Meirowitz (2008)] when there is no asymmetry between
the candidates. In some of these papers there is divergence of platforms in equilibrium. We abstract from
the possibility of divergence and we choose instead to work with a model that corresponds to the more
standard convergence outcome because the focus is not on the interaction between valence and political
competition.
7for the incumbent, and a voting rule, vq : R  [;] ! f0;1g for the voters such that:
(i) eq() 2 argmaxefPr(reelectionjvq(); + e;q)   c(e)g
(ii) vq(s;i) = 1 if and only if E[js;eq()] + i  ^ 
where Pr(reelectionjvq(); + e;q) is the probability of reelection given the voting rule
vq(), the message ~  =  + e and the reelection rule q, and E[js;eq()] is the expected
talent of the incumbent given that the public signal is s and using a posterior distribution
of the incumbent's talent consistent with the equilibrium eort eq().
From condition (ii), and given that all voters observe the same signal s, it is clear that
whenever vq(s;i) = 1 then vq(s;j) = 1 for all j  i. Therefore, given a reelection rule
q, the incumbent is re-elected if and only if the voter with preference q = H 1(1   q)
supports him. The probability of reelection can be written as:
Pr(reelectionjvq(); + e;q) =
Z +1
 1
vq( + e + ;q)g()d
Notice, that for some extreme reelection rules it might be the case that the outcome of
the election is independent of the signal received by the voters because the preferences for
or against the incumbent of the critical voter q outweighs any realization of the talent of
the incumbent. To distinguish these uninteresting cases we denote by q (q) the minimum
(maximum) reelection rule such that the outcome of the reelection is not predetermined.16
Finally, we will say that the noise distribution g() satises the Monotone Likelihood
Ratio Property (MLRP) if whenever ~ 1 > ~ 2, then
g(s ~ 1)
g(s ~ 2) increases in s.17 The MLRP
implies that higher signals lead to higher posterior distributions of the talent (in the sense
of rst-order stochastic dominance).
The following proposition gives some properties of the equilibria and states that in
equilibrium the incumbent is re-elected whenever the public signal is equal to or above a
certain threshold, and is not re-elected otherwise.
Proposition 1. For any reelection rule q 2 (q;q), if the cost of eort, c(), is strictly
convex and the distribution of noise satises the MLRP, then any equilibrium e
q() and
v
q() satises the following conditions:
(i) Voter i's best response is a threshold rule:
vq(s;i) =
(
0 if s < ki
1 if s  ki
(2)
16More precisely, q = 1   H() and q = 1   H( ).
17This denition corresponds to the special case of the MLRP dened by Milgrom (1981) when the
signal structure is additive.
8where ki is determined by E[js = ki;e
q()] + i = M whenever this equation has a so-
lution, and ki = +1 ( 1) if E[js;e
q()] + i < (>) ^  for all s 2 R. Moreover, ki is
decreasing in the preference parameter i.
(ii) The incumbent is re-elected if and only if the public signal is above a threshold kq,
where kq is given by:
E[js = kq;e

q()] = M   H
 1(1   q) (3)
(iii) The incumbent's optimal eort solves:
g( + e
q()   kq) = c0(e
q())
g0( + e
q()   kq)   c00(e
q()) < 0
(4)
Moreover, the incumbent's message is increasing in his type (i.e. ~ L < ~ M < ~ H)
Part (i) of Proposition 1 states that in equilibrium the voters follow a threshold rule
such that they support the incumbent if and only if the signal received is above a threshold
that is decreasing in their preferences for the incumbent. At the threshold ki, voter i is
indierent between supporting the incumbent and appointing a new politician.
Part (ii) states that for reelection, the signal received must be above the threshold kq
that leaves indierent the critical voter with preference q = H 1(1   q).
Part (iii) states the rst and second order conditions for the optimal eort given that
the expected payo of the incumbent can now be written as:
V (;e;q) = G( + e   kq)   c(e)
More importantly the incumbent's message is increasing in his type. Intuitively, all in-
cumbents (independent of their type) have the same reward from re-election, however it
is more costly for low talented incumbents to send high messages. If an incumbent nds
worth to exert some eort to reach the reward, then those more talented will strictly ben-
et to match that message. The monotonicity of the message together with the MLRP
assumption implies that the expected talent given the realization of a signal is increasing
on the signal, and will be widely used in the rest of the paper.
Finally, to guarantee that the local rst and second order condition are sucient for
a global optimum we assume throughout the paper the following condition:
inf
e c




Condition (5) requires the cost function to be suciently convex, so that the marginal
cost cuts only once the marginal benet.
9The proof of Proposition 1 is similar to that of Theorem 1 in Matthews and Mirman
(1983) regarding limit pricing and therefore is relegated to the Appendix.18
3 Simple Majority Rule
As a benchmark consider the simple majority rule q = 1
2. Notice that given the assump-
tions on the voters' preferences for the incumbent, equation (3) becomes:19
E[js = k
] = ^  (6)
where k denotes the equilibrium threshold in the simple majority case. In other words,
the simple majority rule is equivalent to giving all the power to the median voter, the
voter that is ex-ante (before receiving the signal) indierent between the incumbent and
the challenger. The incumbent will be re-elected if and only if this voter believes him to
have a higher than average talent.
The equilibrium for the simple majority rule has the following properties:
Proposition 2. With a simple majority rule, the equilibrium is unique. The eort levels
satisfy eM > eL = eH  e with e = c0 1(g(H   M)) and the threshold signal is given
by k = M + e.
Proof For clarity we omit the reference to the electoral rule on the equilibrium variables.
Given the talent distribution, upon receiving a signal s = k, equation (6) becomes:
P
j jg(k   ~ j)Pr(j)
P
j g(k   ~ j)Pr(j)
= M
and given Pr(H) = Pr(L) and H   M = M   L, it simplies to:
g(k
   ~ H) = g(k
   ~ L) (7)
In particular, given the symmetry of the noise distribution, equation (7) implies that the










18The setup in Matthews and Mirman (1983) is close to ours: a monopoly wants to deter the entrant
of a possible challenger, and they do so by lowering their price, to signal lower protability in the
market. Analogously, a politician exerts eort to signal their type. Note that Proposition 1 is true for an
arbitrary distribution of types, not just for our three-type distribution. In particular, it would be true
for a continuous distribution of types.
19For clarity we suppress reference to the eort function e
1=2().
10Moreover, the rst order conditions for the equilibrium eort (4) together with equa-
tion (7) imply that eH = eL. Denote by e this eort level. Then (8) implies k = M +e.
To see that eM > e notice that, from the single-peakedness and symmetry of g:
g(k
   M   e
) > g(k




that is, the marginal benet for an incumbent with type M of exerting eort e outweighs
the marginal cost of exerting this level of eort. Therefore, eM > e.
Finally, replacing k = M +e into the rst order conditions for e given by equation




where   H   M = M   L represents the dispersion of the talent distribution20. 
The proof of Proposition 2 can be visualized in Figure 1. Both the talents and the
messages can be read on the horizontal axis. The upward sloping lines represent the
marginal costs of eort for each type. Consider the messages sent by the low-quality and
high-quality incumbents, ~ L and ~ H. By Proposition 1, ~ L < ~ H. Since the median voter
is indierent between middle types and the challenger, she will be indierent between
the incumbent and challenger only when the signal is equally likely to be from either
a high or a low type. Therefore using the symmetry of the noise distribution she will
set the threshold of acceptance k at the midpoint between ~ L and ~ H. Given k, the
marginal benet of eort at ~  is g(~    k), i.e. the marginal increase in the probability
of being reelected, which is also depicted in Figure 1. By the symmetry of g, the marginal
benet is symmetric around k, and since k is the middle point between ~ L and ~ H,
the marginal benets of eort at both points are equal. In equilibrium marginal benets
equal marginal costs, and hence the equilibrium eorts exerted by the low-quality and
high-quality incumbents must be the same e
L = e
H = e. Finally, returning to the middle
types, if they exerted the same eort e they would face a higher marginal benet of
eort, due to the single-peakedness of the of the marginal benet function. Thus middle
types increase their eort till their marginal cost equates their marginal benet, at ~ M.
Note that although the message ~  is strictly increasing in an incumbent's type, the eort
is non-monotonic in types.
The eort level e is increasing in , decreasing in the marginal cost, and decreasing
in the dispersion of the incumbent's talent . These results are very intuitive, a direct
change in the marginal benet or cost changes the eort level accordingly. Moreover, if
the distance between incumbents increases then it is more dicult to fool the voters by
exerting eort and therefore the marginal benet of eort goes down and they exert less
20The distance between the talents of the incumbents is a measure of the dispersion of the distribution.
In fact the variance of the talents is given by: V ar() = 2p(H   M)2 = 2p2
11g(~    k)
L M H
c0(eL) c0(eM) c0(eH)
z }| { e
~ L





k = M + e
Figure 1: Equilibrium
eort.
Assuming that the noise is normally distributed with variance 2
 and mean zero, we
can further study how the equilibrium eort level changes with the variance of the noise.
The change in the equilibrium eort with respect to the variance of the noise depends









To understand this result consider the following two extreme scenarios. Suppose that the
signal is extremely noisy, then voters do not infer much from the signal and incumbents
exert very little eort. If the variance of the signal decreases making the signal more
informative, then reelection will be more responsive to the signal received and incumbents
will exert more eort. On the other hand, if the signal is very precise, incumbents are not
going to be able to fool the voters and exert little eort. Condition (9) says that whether
we consider the signal extremely noisy or very precise depends on the relative variances
of the two distributions.
4 Incumbency Advantage
One interesting feature of the equilibrium is that the incumbents with middle talent are
the ones that exert higher eort. The reason is that the equilibrium threshold is closer to
their types and hence they have greater incentive to exert eort. This extra eort from the
incumbents with middle talent implies that the distribution of the messages, signals, and
ultimately of expected types, will be negatively skewed (the median is above the mean)
leading to our result of an incumbency advantage.
In the introduction we have characterized a causal incumbency advantage as a situation
12in which, on average, incumbents have a better-than-50% chance of reelection against
a challenger with similar intrinsic characteristics. Because the quality distribution of
incumbents running for reelection is identical to the quality distribution of challengers,
in our model this is equivalent to saying that on average incumbents are reelected more
than 50% of the time, and this will be our denition of incumbency advantage.
Proposition 3. Under simple majority there is an incumbency advantage.
Proof From Proposition 2, eM > e. The probability of reelection for an incumbent
with talent j that sends message ~ j is then:
Pr(reelection j ~ j) = Pr(~ j +  > k
) = 1   G(k
   j   ej)
The unconditional probability of reelection is therefore:
Pr(s  k) = p(1   G(k   ~ H)) + p(1   G(k   ~ L)) + (1   2p)(1   G(k   ~ M))




Where the second equality follows because G(k ~ H) = 1 G(k ~ L) and the inequality
because eM > e so ~ M > k. 
Intuitively, when the median voter chooses whether to reappoint the incumbent or
not, she compares her updated belief about the talent of the incumbent with the expected
talent of the challenger. In doing so she can ignore middle type incumbents because they
have just average talent, and hence taking into account the equilibrium messages of the
incumbents, the threshold signal would be just the middle point between the messages
sent by the low and the high signals. But given that the incumbents with middle talent
exert more eort than the others, the message ~ M will exceed the threshold and therefore
they will be re-elected in more than half of their attempts.
It is important to note that in this model there is an incumbency advantage on average.
In particular, high-quality incumbents will win a majority of elections, and low-quality
incumbents will lose a majority of elections (as the voters have no information on the
quality of the challenger, so the reelection depends exclusively on the expected quality of
the incumbent). Because of the symmetry in the distribution of types and the fact that
high- and low-quality incumbents exert the same eort, the overall combined reelection
rates of low- and high-quality incumbents is exactly 50%. Hence, whether or not there is
on average an incumbency advantage depends on whether or not middle-type incumbents
are re-elected more than 50% of the time. Since middle-type incumbents send a message
that is above the voters' reelection threshold, a majority of them will indeed be reelected.
This is fully consistent with the empirical literature on causal incumbency advantage.
That literature captures the incumbency advantage among candidates of similar quality,
13but, as quality is unobservable, it cannot estimate separate incumbency advantages for
dierent levels of quality. Instead, it can only estimate the average advantage across qual-
ity pairs. Hence, it is perfectly possible that at low quality levels there is an incumbency
disadvantage, as in our model.
Relatedly, it is also important to note that just because signalling leads to an incum-
bency advantage does not imply that signalling is socially harmful. Consider what would
happen in our model if signalling were not possible (equivalently, if eort was innitely
costly). The reelection threshold would again be halfway between the low and high mes-
sages, but there would be no incumbency advantage, because the middle type would not
exert any eort. However voter welfare would be the same as in the case with signalling,
because although fewer middle types would be reelected, the welfare value of middle types
is neutral anyway.21
5 Supermajority
In this section we consider the social planner's problem of maximizing the total welfare of
the voters by choosing a reelection rule (we treat the welfare of the incumbent politician as
negligible when computing the social welfare). We prove that the simple majority rule is
suboptimal and that the welfare maximizing rule must be a supermajority rule (q > 1
2).22
We proceed in two steps. First, we show that under simple majority voters would
be better o if they could commit to a higher threshold to re-elect the incumbent. This
commitment is not credible because ex post it is ecient to re-elect the incumbent if the
updated beliefs indicate that he is above average (i.e., if the median voter would prefer
him). We then propose a way to implement this commitment by setting a supermajority
rule that takes decision power from the median voter and gives it to a voter with a partisan
position somewhat against the incumbent.
Proposition 4. Under simple majority, the welfare maximizing reelection threshold is
above the equilibrium threshold k.
Proof Given a threshold k, the expected welfare can be expressed as the value of the
outside option (the expected value of a challenger, M), plus the expected change in value
21The neutrality of signalling for welfare purposes may be specic to our three-type models. For general
distributions of types, under simple majority the kind of signalling we model could be welfare improving
or welfare reducing. The point we are making here is that it is not necessarily welfare reducing. What we
believe is always true is that irrespective of the welfare consequences of signalling under simple majority,
welfare can always be improved by increasing the reelection threshold, which is the subject of the next
section.
22This seems to contradict the literature on biased contests [Meyer (1991; 1992)] in which favoring
early success by increasing the probability of success in later contests might be optimal. However, in the
setup of those papers, either no action (eort) was required from the contesters, or all the contester had
the same known ability (no types), and hence the incentive eect that arise from the supermajority rule
in the present paper cannot be present there.
14from retaining the incumbent:23
EW = M + pPr(~ H +   k)(H   M) + pPr(~ L +   k)(L   M)
= M + p(G(~ H   k)   G(~ L   k))
(11)
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At the equilibrium threshold, g(~ H k) = g(~ L k), therefore if we evaluate the derivative
(12) at k, the direct eect on welfare of a change in the threshold is zero. However, the
change in the threshold also aects the choice of eort. Recall that the optimal level of
eort given a threshold k satises the following rst and second order conditions:
g(j + ej   k) = c0(ej)
g0(j + ej   k)   c00(ej) < 0
(13)





g0(j + ej   k)
g0(j + ej   k)   c00(ej)
(14)
and using the second order condition and the fact that g0(L + eL   k) > 0 > g0(H +
eH   k) we have that:
@eH
@k





   
k=k
< 0
Hence, plugging this into (12), the indirect eect on welfare of a raise in the threshold is
positive. Increasing the threshold causes H to exert more eort24 while L will reduce
his eort, leading to more separation between the incumbents' signals and as a result an
increase in welfare.
We have shown that welfare is improved by marginally increasing the threshold from
its Nash equilibrium level. However this is not sucient to show that a threshold higher
than the Nash equilibrium threshold is optimal, because the welfare function may not
be single-peaked. We therefore demonstrate below that for any threshold k < k the
correspondent welfare is strictly lower than the welfare at the equilibrium threshold k.
To see that, rst notice that given j, the optimal eort level ej dened by equation (13)
is a single-peaked function of the threshold k. For a given j, the eort ej() is increasing
for k < j +c0 1(g(0)) and decreasing otherwise. Moreover, given equation (13), we have
23The partisan preferences (i) disappear from this expression, because of their zero mean.
24A marginally higher threshold also leads the middle M to exert more eort. To see this observe that
M + eM   k = eM   e > 0 and hence g0(M + eM   k) < 0 and @eM
@k jk=k > 0.
15eL() eH()
k k | {z }
H   L
Figure 2: Eort functions
the following identity:
eL(k   (H   L))  eH(k)
so the optimal eort function of the low type is a horizontal shift to the left of the eort
of the high type (see Figure 2).
At the equilibrium threshold, eL(k) = eH(k)  e so eL(k) = eL(k   (H   L))
which implies that k is on the downward-sloping part of curve eL() and on the upward-
sloping part of eH(). A representation of the eort functions can be seen in Figure 2.
Consider k < k, then eL(k) > eH(k) and hence the distance between the high and
low messages under threshold k is smaller than under threshold k:
~ H(k)   ~ L(k) < ~ 

H   ~ 

L (15)
Notice that by the symmetry of the noise distribution, the following two remarks are
satised:
R1: Whenever two points are at a xed distance h, G(x)   G(x   h) is maximized at
x = h
2, that is, when the two points are equidistant to the mean.25
R2: Given two points equidistant to the mean, the dierence in the cumulative distri-






















We can now conclude that for any threshold k < k the welfare under threshold k is
25To see this consider the rst order condition with respect to x: g(x)   g(x   h) = 0, and by the
symmetry of g(), this implies x =  (x   h) or x = h
2.
16lower than under the equilibrium threshold k:
EW(k) = M + p(G(~ H(k)   k)   G(~ L(k)   k))
 M + p(G(
~ H(k) ~ L(k)
2 )   G( 
~ H(k) ~ L(k)
2 ))










where the rst inequality follows from R1 and the second from R2 and (15). 
Proposition 4 implies that the voters would be better o if they could commit to re-
elect incumbents that have expected talent above a level which is strictly higher than the
ex-ante average talent. An increase in the threshold will cause high types to exert more
eort and low types to exert less eort. For both types their eorts will not oset the
increase in the threshold, so both will be re-elected with a lower probability. But it is the
larger fall in the probability of low-type reelection that increases welfare.
This higher threshold is not optimal ex post, because it asks the voters to not re-
elect some politicians with expected talent strictly greater than the expected talent of
the challenger. It is not clear that individual voters have access to credible commitment
devices, allowing them to implement the higher threshold. However committing to a
higher threshold has a natural interpretation with respect to the electorate as a whole: a
constitutional rule such that incumbents will only be allowed a second term if they exceed
some threshold of the vote share strictly greater than one half, i.e. a supermajority rule.
If all voters are identical then this rule, of course, has no eect. However, if the
voters dier in their preferences for the incumbent, in the way we have assumed, then a
supermajority rule transfers the decision power from the median voter to a voter that is
ideologically opposed to the incumbent.26 Therefore a supermajority rule acts in eect as
a commitment device that sets a higher threshold of talent for reelection.
Proposition 5. The welfare maximizing reelection rule is a supermajority rule (qW > 1
2).
Proof Given a threshold k, there is a reelection rule that implements that threshold in
equilibrium. Denote by ek() the optimal eort the incumbent exerts if he faces threshold
k,27 as a function of his type. We dene q(k) as follows:
q(k) = 1   H(M   E[js = k;ek()]) (16)
26Another source of voter heterogeneity may be dierential information. However if agents are ratio-
nal, and there is common knowledge of rationality, then it is dicult to argue that the heterogeneous
information will not be eciently aggregated. Information can be indirectly passed through, for example,
opinion polls. If a voter compares her own private signal with the aggregated signals of 1000 people in
an opinion poll, then the latter would seem to swamp the former. Also voters should vote using the ex-
pectations conditional on being decisive; this force will generally make a supermajority rule less eective
[see Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)].
27The eort function ek() solves equation (13).
17Clearly, setting the reelection rule q = q(k) leads to the equilibrium eort e
q(k)() 
ek() and to the equilibrium threshold kq(k) = k. To prove Proposition 5 it would be
sucient to prove that q(k) is increasing in k. However this need not be true everywhere.
As the threshold gets past a certain point both high and low types will react to an increase
in the threshold by lowering their levels of eort (see Figure 2), thus an increase in the
threshold could correspond to a lower expected quality from a signal sent at the threshold.
To prove the result we proceed in two steps. First we show that the equation q(k) = 1
2
has a unique solution at k. Then we show that q() is strictly increasing at k, the
equilibrium threshold of the simple majority case. Since q() is continuous, this implies
that for any k > k, q(k) > q(k) = 1
2.
Formally, q(k) = 1
2 if and only if E[js = k;ek()] = M. By equation (6), k satises
E[js = k;ek()] = M. To see that k is the unique solution to this equation notice
that if E[js = k;ek()] = M, it has to be the case that ~ L(k) and ~ H(k) are equidistant
to the threshold k. This implies that ek(L) = ek(H) = k   M. Substituting this in the
rst order conditions leads to ek(L) = e = c0 1((H   M)) and k = k.
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where the inequality follows because D > 0, g0(~ H   k) =  g0(~ L   k) < 0 by the
equilibrium condition (11) and
@ej(k)
@k < 1 for j 2 fH;Lg by equation (14).
Therefore, denoting by kW the welfare maximizing threshold dened by equation (12),




In this section we present a simple numerical exercise to illustrate the potential magnitudes
involved in our model. The exercise has two modest goals. First, to show that a set of
parameters which seem intuitively reasonable (to the authors at least) can reproduce
incumbency eects of the right magnitude. Second, to show that the implications for an
optimal supermajority rule and its welfare eects are also of an intuitive magnitude.
18We assume that the noise and preference distributions are normal. We also assume
a quadratic cost of eort function, c(e) = c
2e2, and without loss of generality we set
M = 0 and  = 1. The model has then ve free parameters: (1) the variance of the noise
distribution 2
, (2) the variance of the voters' preferences 2
, (3) the dispersion of the
talent distribution  = H   M, (4) the probability of the high and low types p, and (5)
the parameter c in the cost-of-eort function.28
Numerical experimentation, documented below, shows that the optimal reelection
threshold is fairly insensitive to three of these ve parameters: namely c, 2
, and .
We thus x these parameters at the arbitrary values of 0:25, 1, and 1:5. We then cal-
ibrate 2
 and p (to both of which the optimal supermajority rule is quite sensitive) by
targeting the causal incumbency advantage numbers reported in Lee (2008). That paper
uses a regression discontinuity analysis on U.S. Congressional elections, and nds that
the dierence in the probability of winning an election between a marginal winner and a
marginal loser (i.e., a winner or loser of the previous election) is 35%, and that the average
dierence in vote shares is of 7%.29 The model's formulas for probability of reelection and
vote share are reported in the appendix. Solving these formulas to match Lee's estimates
yields the probabilities of the low and high type to be p = 0:165 and a standard deviation
for voters' ideological preferences of  = 0:6. With these parameters, using equations
(12) and (16), the optimal supermajority rule is qW = 57%. This supermajority rule leads
to a welfare increase of 3:35% relative to simple majority.
In Figure 3 we plot the optimal supermajority rule as a function of each of the pa-
rameters, holding all remaining parameters xed at the benchmark level. As can be seen
the optimal reelection threshold is fairly insensitive to c, 2
, and , but not to p and
.30 Figure 4 shows voters' welfare as a function of the reelection rule: a supermajority
dominates simple majority for all supermajorities less than 61%.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper derives novel implications of signalling by incumbent electoral candidates.
From a positive standpoint, it provides an explanation for incumbency advantage. It also
rationalizes the use of spin and advertising by incumbents, with rational voters. From
a normative perspective, it suggests that if incumbents can use their term in oce to
inuence the voters' perception of their ability, handicapping the incumbent by requiring









29These numbers correspond to the party rather than the candidate incumbency advantage and average
vote share advantage. The problem with the establishment of a candidate incumbency advantage is that
there is an endogenous attrition of candidates that distorts the results.
30We restrict the support of c and  to those values satisfying the sucient condition 5.










































Figure 3: Optimal supermajority rule for changes in the parameters. Default parameters:
c = 1
4,  = 1:5, p = 0:165,  = 1,  = 0:6
a higher vote share to be re-elected can improve welfare.
We have derived these results using a three-type model. A natural question is whether
our results would extend to more general distributions of types. As already mentioned,
extensive numerical calculations suggest that both the positive and the normative pre-
dictions of the model are robust to a wide range of discrete and continuous distributions
of types, though a formal proof has eluded us thus far. Our conjecture, therefore, is
that incumbency advantage and the optimality of supermajority reelection thresholds are
generic features of models with (noisy) signalling by incumbents (as long as the signalling
has no direct welfare costs, of course. If there are direct costs the supermajority results
will depend on the relative benets of improved screening and the cost of the signalling
action).31
We reiterate that in our model incumbency advantage is not a \problem", nor is the
supermajority reelection threshold a solution to a pathology. However incumbency ad-
vantage is an indication that incumbents engage in signalling, and voters have then an
31A special case is when there are only two types (p = 0:5 in our model). Then there is no incumbency
advantage. It is still optimal to have a supermajority reelection rule, though.










Figure 4: Welfare for dierent supermajority rules. (c = 1
4,  = 1:5, p = 0:165,  = 1,
 = 0:6.)
incentive to take advantage of such signalling by choosing the reelection threshold ap-
propriately. Note, too that the aim of the supermajority reelection threshold is not to
eliminate the incumbency advantage. In our calibration, a small incumbency advantage
remains even at the optimal threshold.32
Throughout the paper we have assumed the incumbent faces only a single challenger.
To implement our supermajority rule in situations with multiple candidates one possibil-
ity is a two-part ballot: In the rst part voters indicate whether they wish to retain the
incumbent. In the second part they choose their preferred challenger. This has the ad-
vantage of not handicapping the incumbent's party, for example a Republican incumbent
can run for reelection, and the Republican party can also eld a challenger. This ballot
structure has been used in some recall elections, e.g. that used for California Governor
Gray Davis in 2003.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our model can be seen as an extension of the noisy
signalling model of Matthews and Mirman (1983) which applies to limit pricing. Besides
limit pricing our approach may be fruitful in a number of other contexts in which thresh-
olds are observed. A natural analogue to elections is a hiring decision: internal candidates
may face an advantage simply due to their ability to signal [Chan (1996)], and rms may
therefore nd it optimal to handicap internal candidates, to improve the separation of
types. More generally the results could be applied to competitions which award a prize
for demonstrating an ability which exceeds some threshold, such as acceptance into a
32Nor is it true, however, that at the optimal reelection threshold there will always be an incumbency
advantage. For example, when the probability of the middle type is zero, a supermajority threshold lowers
the probability of reelection for both types, thus lowering the average probability of reelection below 1
2.
21program conditional on the score on a standardized test. Without commitment, more ap-
plicants will pass the test than would pass under full information; and with commitment,
the administrators of the competition have an incentive to announce a higher threshold.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We begin with two preliminary results. In Lemma 6 we show that if the cost function is
convex, the message sent by the incumbent is nondecreasing in his type.
Lemma 6. Given a reelection rule q, if c() is strictly convex, and eq() is a best response
to vq(), then the corresponding message ~ q() is non decreasing in .
Proof Let 1 < 2, and denote ~ q(i) by ~ i and Pr(reelectionjvq(); ~ i;q) by P(~ i).
Since eq() (and therefore ~ q()) is a best response to vq(),
P(~ 1)   c(~ 1   1)  P(~ 2)   c(~ 2   1)
P(~ 2)   c(~ 2   2)  P(~ 1)   c(~ 1   2)
Rearranging:
c(~ 2   1)   c(~ 1   1)  (P(~ 2)   P(~ 1))  c(~ 2   2)   c(~ 1   2)
Since the distance between the two sets of points is the same: j(~ 2  1) (~ 1  1)j =
j(~ 2   2)   (~ 1   2)j, the convexity of c() implies that ~ 1  ~ 2. 
In Lemma 7 we nd sucient conditions so that each voter's best response is a thresh-
old rule.
Lemma 7. If ~ q() is increasing and g() satises the MLRP, then voter i's best response
is a threshold rule:
vq(s;i) =
(
0 if s < ki
1 if s  ki
where ki is determined by E[js = ki;eq()]+i = ^  whenever this equation has a solution,
and ki = +1 ( 1) if E[js;eq()]+i < (>) ^  for all s 2 R. Moreover, ki is decreasing
in the preference parameter i.
Proof If ~ () is increasing in  and g() satises the MLRP, the conditional expectation
of the talent is increasing in the signal received by the voter [Milgrom (1981)], i.e., if s1<s2
then E[js1;eq()] < E[js2;eq()].
Moreover, since no information is revealed from the challenger, the expected talent of
the challenger coincides with the mean of the talent distribution. Therefore, a voter with
partisan position i supports the incumbent if and only if:
E[js;eq()] + i  ^ 
26Since the conditional expectation is increasing and continuous, if the equation E[js =
ki;eq()]+i = ^  has a solution it has to be unique and voter i follows a threshold rule in
which v(s;i) = 1 if and only if s  ki. Finally, by the monotonicity of the expectation,
ki is decreasing in i. 
Now we prove Proposition 1. For any q 2 (q;q), and any equilibrium e
q() and v
q(), if
c() is convex, Lemma 6 implies that ~ 
q() is nondecreasing in theta. By the MLRP this
implies that E[js;eq()] is nondecreasing in s, and therefore v
q(;q) is nondecreasing in
s where q = H 1(1   q). If v
q(;q) is constant, then the outcome of the reelections is
independent of the signal and hence the incumbent exert zero eort, e
q()  0. But then
~ () =  is strictly increasing in  and Lemma 7, together with the fact that q < q < q
imply that v
q(;q) is not constant. Therefore v
q(;q) must be a threshold rule with
some threshold kq. By the monotonicity of the expectation, v(kq;i) = 1 for all i  q.
Moreover, for all s < kq, v(s;j) = 0 for all j < q. Therefore, the incumbent is re-elected
if and only if s  kq, which proves part (ii).
Finally, given a threshold kq, the probability of reelection for an incumbent that sends
message ~  is Pr(~  +   kq) = 1   G(kq   ~ ) = G(~    kq), where the last equality comes
by the symmetry of the noise distribution. We can now write the expected payo of the
incumbent as:
V (;e;q) = G( + e   kq)   c(e)
then the (local) rst and second order conditions for the optimal eort level, e
q() are:
g( + e
q()   kq) = c0(e
q())
g0( + e
q()   kq)   c00(e
q()) < 0








q()   kq)   c00(e
q())
>  1
where the last inequality follows by the convexity of c(). This implies that the message
sent by the incumbent, ~ q =  + e
q(), is strictly increasing in his type. 
A.2 Formulas for calibration
Given the quadratic cost and the normal distributions, the equilibrium of the model is
the following:











27where () is the standard Normal density distribution.
The probability of winning for an incumbent is given by equation (10) and hence the
dierence in the probability of winning between the incumbent and the challenger is:








where () is the standard Normal cumulative distribution.
Note that Lee (2008) computes the dierence in the probability of winning between a
marginal winner and a marginal loser. This avoids the problem of unobserved heterogene-
ity between winners and losers, if there is sucient unpredictable noise in votes. Posterior
dierences between a bare winner and loser thus must be caused by the fact of winning
or losing. In our model, all the politicians come from the same distribution of talents and
therefore they are ex-ante identical and the dierence in the probability of winning comes
entirely from having been incumbent.
To compute the average vote share, note that given a signal s the share of voters that






H(E[js]) g(sj~ j)ds (19)
and the dierence in the average vote share between the incumbent and the challenger is
y = AV S   (1   AV S)
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